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A STRANGE DISTINCTION: CHARITABLE 
IMMUNITY AND CLERGY SEXUAL ABUSE IN 
PICHER V. ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF 
PORTLAND 
Matthew Cobb* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 2009, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, decided 
Picher v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland,1 a case that presented an issue of 
first impression in Maine:  whether the doctrine of charitable immunity2 protected 
charitable organizations from liability for intentional torts.3  The court ultimately 
held that charitable immunity was not a defense to intentional torts, but that it did 
bar negligence claims based on the sexual abuse of a minor.4   
In Picher, a majority of the Law Court partly vacated the trial court’s grant of 
summary judgment for the Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland (Bishop)5 and held 
that the doctrine of charitable immunity did not protect the Bishop from liability for 
the alleged intentional tort of fraudulent concealment.6  The majority stated three 
reasons for its decision:  (1) charitable immunity is a discredited doctrine; (2) the 
Legislature did not intend to extend the reach of the doctrine to intentional torts 
with the enactment of title 14, section 158 of the Maine Revised Statutes in 1965;7 
and (3) there is an absence of any convincing public policy reasons for expanding 
the scope of the doctrine to cover intentional torts.8  The dissent argued that section 
158 did afford protection from liability for intentional torts and that the majority 
had “invad[ed] the province of the Legislature” by not maintaining that protection.9  
Moreover, the dissent cautioned that as a result of the court’s decision, charitable 
institutions would now be compelled to use their funds to defend lawsuits anytime 
a plaintiff pled an intentional tort in a cause of action.10 
Although the majority reached the proper conclusion in not extending 
charitable immunity to cover intentional torts, the court should also have found that 
the doctrine did not absolve the Bishop from potential liability for negligent 
                                                                                                     
 * J.D. Candidate, 2011, University of Maine School of Law. 
 1. 2009 ME 67, 974 A.2d 286. 
 2. Charitable immunity in Maine is a common law doctrine that protects charitable institutions 
from tort liability.  See Thompson v. Mercy Hosp., 483 A.2d 706, 707-09 (Me. 1984). 
 3. Picher, 2009 ME 67, ¶ 10, 974 A.2d at 290.  
 4. Id. ¶ 1, 974 A.2d at 288. 
 5. Id.  
 6. Id. ¶ 10, 974 A.2d at 290. 
 7. The statute states in relevant part:  “A charitable organization shall be considered to have 
waived its immunity from liability for negligence or any other tort during the period a policy of 
insurance is effective covering the liability of the charitable organization for negligence or any other 
tort.”  ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 158 (2003). 
 8. Picher, 2009 ME 67, ¶ 29, 974 A.2d at 295. 
 9. Id. ¶¶ 42-43, 974 A.2d at 299 (Alexander, J., dissenting).  
 10. Id. at ¶ 41. 
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supervision, given the public policy rationale underlying that tort in Maine.  This 
Note will detail the history of charitable immunity in Maine and will examine how 
other jurisdictions have dealt with the immunity.  This Note will analyze the Picher 
decision, with particular emphasis placed on the policy rationales in both the 
majority and dissenting opinions.  Moreover, this Note will argue that the 
compelling public interest in protecting individuals of limited capacity from the 
sexual depredations of persons with power and authority over them is the 
underlying rationale for not allowing a charitable organization to escape liability by 
pleading the defense of immunity from tort.  Finally, this Note will conclude that, 
based on that compelling public interest, the majority was correct in not expanding 
the scope of charitable immunity to intentional torts, but that the Law Court should 
have also carved out an exception to the charitable immunity defense for the tort of 
negligent supervision. 
II.  THE CHARITABLE IMMUNITY DOCTRINE 
A.  The History of Charitable Immunity in Maine 
Charitable immunity originated in England in the mid-nineteenth century,11 
premised on the notion that charitable donations were held in trust by charitable 
institutions to be used exclusively for philanthropic purposes, and therefore, should 
not be diverted to satisfy tort claims.12  However, this theory was subsequently 
overruled and abandoned in England just two decades later.13  Despite the failure of 
the doctrine to take root in England, charitable immunity was adopted in the United 
States in McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital14 and continued to spread 
until it was recognized in some form by almost every jurisdiction in the United 
States.15  
The Law Court, in 1910, established the doctrine of charitable immunity in 
Maine with its decision in Jensen v. Maine Eye & Ear Infirmary.16  In that case, the 
administrator of Mary Jensen’s estate claimed that the infirmary’s employees were 
negligent in not properly monitoring Jensen, who had been suffering from typhoid 
fever at the facility, when she fell to her death from an open window.17  The court 
held that Jensen’s claim was barred as a matter of law and proclaimed: 
No principle of law seems to be better established both upon reason and authority 
than that which declares that a purely charitable institution, supported by funds 
furnished by private and public charity, cannot be made liable in damages for the 
negligent acts of its servants.  Were it not so, it is not difficult to discern that 
private gift and public aid would not long be contributed to feed the hungry maw 
of litigation, and charitable institutions of all kinds would ultimately cease or 
                                                                                                     
 11. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895E cmt. b. (1979) (explaining the history of 
charitable immunity). 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. 120 Mass. 432 (Mass. 1876). 
 15. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895E cmt. b. (1979) 
 16. 107 Me. 408, 78 A. 898 (1910). 
 17. Id.  
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become greatly impaired in their usefulness.18 
Charitable immunity remained unchallenged in Maine until the 1960s when it 
received increased attention from the courts and the Legislature.  In the 1963 case 
of Mendall v. Pleasant Mountain Ski Development, Inc.,19 the Law Court was urged 
to overrule Jensen.20  The court declined to do so and noted that the Jensen 
decision rested upon two principles:  “(1) that funds donated for charitable 
purposes are held in trust to be used exclusively for those purposes, and (2) that to 
permit the invasion of these funds to satisfy tort claims would destroy the sources 
of charitable support upon which the enterprise depends.”21  Moreover, the court 
maintained that if charitable immunity were to be abolished in Maine, “such a far 
reaching change in policy should be initiated in the Legislature.”22  Two years later, 
the Legislature enacted 14 M.R.S.A. section 158, which waived a charity’s 
immunity for “negligence or any other tort” when a policy of insurance was 
effective covering the organization’s liability.23  In 1967, the Law Court interpreted 
the significance of that provision for the first time in Rhoda v. Aroostook General 
Hospital.24  The court asserted in that case that the language of section 158 was 
“tacit recognition that the immunity of charitable institutions from liability for 
corporate negligence as well as for the negligence of subordinate employees shall 
remain where no insurance coverage is provided.”25  However, that reading of the 
statute was used to support the court’s holding that there was no sound reason for 
distinguishing between the negligence of a charity’s everyday servants, and that of 
its corporate officers in selecting and supervising those servants, when determining 
whether charitable immunity was applicable.26 
Following these decisions in the 1960s and leading up to Picher, the focus 
shifted in charitable immunity cases from arguments against the doctrine itself to 
litigation concerning whether organizations were entitled to the defense.  For 
example, in Thompson v. Mercy Hospital,27 the Law Court reasoned that because 
gifts and donations to Mercy Hospital comprised a negligible percentage of its 
annual revenues, the policies underlying the doctrine were not implicated and 
charitable immunity was therefore not available as a defense.28  Additionally, the 
court explained that “[t]he doctrine of charitable immunity is a creation of our 
common law.  Except for one significant restriction imposed by statute, its 
                                                                                                     
 18. Id. at 410-11, 78 A. at 898.  It would seem that this declaration by the court was drawing on the 
fact that charitable immunity had been adopted in a growing number of US jurisdictions at that point in 
time and was ignorant of, or indifferent to, the reality that the doctrine had originally been tried and 
abandoned in England nearly half a century earlier.  
 19. 159 Me. 285, 191 A.2d 633 (1963). 
 20. Id. at 290, 191 A.2d at 636. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14 § 158 (2003). 
 24. 226 A.2d 530 (Me. 1967). 
 25. Id. at 533. 
 26. Id. at 531. 
 27. 483 A.2d 706 (Me. 1984). 
 28. Id. at 707-08.  See also Child v. Cent. Me. Med. Ctr., 575 A.2d 318 (Me. 1990) (holding that the 
nonprofit status of the organization did not entitle it to charitable immunity because less than two 
percent of its funds were derived from private contributions).   
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applicability in Maine is controlled entirely by the precedents of this Court.”29  On 
the other hand, the Law Court found in the 2002 case of Coulombe v. Salvation 
Army30 that the profits the Salvation Army had acquired by investing a portion of 
its charitable funds were the equivalent of “income from ‘public [or] private 
charity,’”31 and because it received more than half its funding from charitable 
sources, it was thus entitled to the defense of charitable immunity.32  Despite the 
fact that legal arguments in Maine had gravitated away from challenging the 
doctrine itself during this time period, almost every other state had 
contemporaneously rejected charitable immunity as a defense to liability.  
B.  Charitable Immunity in Other Jurisdictions 
The vast majority of jurisdictions in the United States no longer recognize 
charitable immunity as a defense to tort claims.33  The erosion of the doctrine 
began in 1942 with the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia in President & Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes.34  
In that case, a nurse who worked at the Georgetown Hospital brought a claim for 
negligence and contributory negligence against the defendant organization after she 
was injured by a swinging door that had been “violently” pushed open by a student 
nurse who also worked at the hospital.35  The court began its analysis by noting that 
“[f]or negligent or tortious conduct liability is the rule.  Immunity is the 
exception.”36  It went on to illustrate that under the charitable immunity doctrine, 
an individual who continuously pursues charitable work is not protected by the 
doctrine, but if he were to form that same charitable enterprise into an organization, 
he would be able to avoid liability for the organization’s carelessness.37  The court 
found this to be a “strange distinction”38 and one that “reverses the general trend of 
responsibility in a risk-sharing and distributing age.”39  Ultimately, the court 
condemned the immunity as “out of step with the general trend of legislative and 
judicial policy in distributing losses incurred by individuals through the operation 
of an enterprise among all who benefit by it rather than in leaving them wholly to 
be borne by those who sustain them.”40  In reaching its conclusion, the court noted 
that the widespread availability of insurance at manageable premiums should 
assuage those who feared that abandoning the doctrine would deter charitable 
donations and eventually lead to the systematic demise of charitable 
organizations.41  After this decision by the court of appeals, a number of other 
                                                                                                     
 29. Thompson, 483 A.2d at 707 (internal citations omitted). 
 30. 2002 ME 25, 790 A.2d 593. 
 31. Id. ¶ 11, 790 A.2d at 596. 
 32. Id.   
 33. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895E (1979). 
 34. 130 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1942). 
 35. Id. at 811. 
 36. Id. at 812. 
 37. Id. at 814. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id.  
 40. Georgetown, 130 F.2d at 827. 
 41. Id. at 823-24. 
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jurisdictions began to follow the Georgetown court’s reasoning in what became a 
widespread abolition of the doctrine.42  Currently, thirty-six American jurisdictions 
no longer recognize charitable immunity.43 
The doctrine has survived in some states through legislative enactments that 
have preserved the immunity by limiting the amount of damages that can be 
recovered from a charitable organization.  For example, after the New Jersey 
Supreme Court dissolved charitable immunity in Collopy v. Newark Eye & Ear 
Infirmary,44 that state’s legislature revived the doctrine.45  The Massachusetts 
Legislature imposed a similar restriction, limiting recovery to $20,000 for liability 
stemming from charitable activities, but placed no restrictions on damages that 
resulted from a charitable organization’s commercial endeavors.46   
A small number of American courts have made noticeable modifications to the 
doctrine such as limiting the immunity to the protection of charitable trusts and 
refusing to extend the scope of the immunity to protect against liability for 
intentional torts.  In 1952, the Supreme Court of Colorado, in St. Luke’s Hospital 
Ass’n v. Long,47 explained that the law in that state concerning charitable immunity 
was that the “exemption and protection afforded to a charitable institution is not 
immunity from suit . . . but that the protection actually given is to the trust funds 
themselves.”48  Similarly, Tennessee’s highest court held in O’Quin v. Baptist 
Memorial Hospital49 that a charitable hospital could not completely avoid liability 
for the negligence of its servants because the immunity only extended to the 
protection of the charitable trust.50 
The issue of charitable immunity protection from intentional tort liability was 
addressed in 1973 by the Supreme Court of South Carolina in Jeffcoat v. Caine.51  
In that case, a plaintiff brought a claim of false imprisonment against a charitable 
hospital.52  That court reversed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment for 
the hospital on the basis of charitable immunity and reasoned that none of its past 
decisions had contemplated expanding the protection of the doctrine beyond mere 
negligence.53  The court emphasized that “we know of no public policy . . . which 
would require the exemption of the charity from liability for an intentional tort.”54  
Likewise, in 2006 the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the statutory 
enactment granting immunity to charities in that state reached no further than 
protection from claims of ordinary negligence and did not extend to cover 
                                                                                                     
 42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895E cmt. b. (1979). 
 43. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS app. § 895E, court citations (1982, 1991, 2008). 
 44. 141 A.2d 276 (N.J. 1958) (holding that the rationale for the doctrine is flawed and outdated and 
that judges need not be held back by stare decisis in addressing the needs and responsibilities of modern 
society in the realm of tort law).  
 45. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-7 (West 2000 & 2009-2010). 
 46. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85K (West 2000). 
 47. 240 P.2d 917 (Colo. 1952). 
 48. Id. at 920 (citations omitted). 
 49. 201 S.W.2d 694 (Tenn. 1947). 
 50. Id. at 696.  
 51. 198 S.E.2d 258 (S.C. 1973). 
 52. Id. at 259. 
 53. Id. at 259-60. 
 54. Id. at 260. 
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intentional torts.55 
III.  THE PICHER DECISION 
In Picher, the Law Court was tasked with determining to what extent the 
Bishop, as a corporation sole,56 could be held liable for civil claims surrounding the 
alleged sexual abuse of a young boy by his priest.57  William Picher attended St. 
Mary’s Church and St. Mary’s School in Augusta during the 1980s where he 
participated in a number of extracurricular activities.58  It was alleged that from 
1986, when Picher was twelve years old, to June 1988, Picher was sexually abused 
by Raymond Melville, a priest at St. Mary’s who had been assigned there by the 
Bishop.59  In February 2007, Picher filed a complaint against Melville and the 
Bishop, including claims against the Bishop for negligent supervision, breach of 
fiduciary duty, and canonical agency.60  Melville defaulted, and in January 2008, 
after a hearing on damages, a judgment of more than $4 million was entered 
against the former priest.61  Subsequently, the Bishop filed a motion for summary 
judgment based on the affirmative defense of charitable immunity.62  While the 
motion for summary judgment was pending, the trial court granted Picher’s motion 
to amend his complaint to include an intentional tort claim against the Bishop for 
the alleged fraudulent concealment of information regarding Melville’s prior sexual 
improprieties.63  Ultimately, the trial court granted the Bishop’s motion for 
summary judgment, holding that charitable immunity covered both intentional and 
negligence based torts.64   
On appeal, Picher argued that, based on the facts asserted in his claim, the Law 
Court should not recognize charitable immunity as a defense to torts related to the 
sexual abuse of a minor.  Picher first noted that the doctrine leaves the injured party 
without a remedy and essentially forces the “innocent victim to bear the burden of 
his injuries to protect the perceived benefit to society” derived from the work of 
charitable institutions.65  Moreover, Picher maintained that this injustice was most 
apparent in the context of intentional torts.66  With respect to the negligent 
supervision claim, Picher noted that the court’s decision in Fortin v. Roman 
Catholic Bishop of Portland67 had officially recognized the tort under factual 
                                                                                                     
 55. Hardwicke v. Am. Boychoir Sch., 902 A.2d 900, 917 (N.J. 2006).  
 56. The Bishop and his successors in that office are in essence the embodiment of the Roman 
Catholic Bishop of Portland as a corporate entity and as such are subject to all the laws of the State of 
Maine.  See Picher, 2009 ME 67, ¶ 4 n.2, 871 A.2d at 289.  
 57. Id. ¶¶ 1-2, 974 A.2d at 288. 
 58. Brief of Appellant William Picher at 1-2, Picher v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, 2009 
ME 67, 974 A.2d 286 (No. KEN-08-81) [hereinafter “Brief of Appellant”]. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 2-3. 
 61. Id. at 3 n.1. 
 62. See Picher, 2009 ME 67, ¶ 1, 974 A.2d at 288.   
 63. Brief of Appellant, supra note 58, at 4.  Picher maintained that the Bishop had knowledge that 
Melville sexually abused a young boy while in seminary in Baltimore, Maryland.  Id. at 8.  
 64. Picher, 2009 ME 67, ¶ 6, 974 A.2d at 289.  
 65. Brief of Appellant, supra note 58, at 24.  
 66. Id. 
 67. 2005 ME 57, 871 A.2d 1208. 
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circumstances substantially similar to this,68 and he asserted that charitable 
immunity should not be a defense to acts of negligence that resulted in the sexual 
abuse of a minor.69   
Conversely, the Bishop argued that the doctrine of charitable immunity in 
Maine had been firmly established nearly a century ago and had been reaffirmed as 
recently as 2002.70  Thus, the Bishop asserted that if the court reversed the 
judgment of the trial court, it would be overruling a long line of its own precedent 
and would be ignoring the Legislature’s purported adoption of charitable immunity 
in section 158.71  Moreover, the Bishop maintained that the essence of charitable 
immunity was the protection of charitable funds from civil judgments, and, as such, 
the doctrine was not specific to any particular form of conduct, but rather was 
driven by a party’s status as a charitable institution.72  Finally, the Bishop 
contended that even if the court abrogated charitable immunity to permit 
intentional tort claims, the Bishop, as a corporation sole, could not be held 
vicariously liable for the alleged intentional tort of fraudulent concealment because 
such actions are considered to be outside the scope of employment.73 
A majority of the Law Court upheld charitable immunity as a defense to the 
negligent supervision claim against the Bishop, but declined to extend the doctrine 
to cover the intentional tort claim of fraudulent concealment.74  Justice Silver, 
writing for the majority, stated three reasons for not expanding the doctrine to 
cover intentional torts:  (1) the doctrine was discredited in almost all other 
jurisdictions; (2) section 158 did not expand the scope of the doctrine to cover 
intentional torts; and (3) prior decisions by the court had maintained the doctrine, 
but refused to expand it.75  The majority declined, however, to determine whether 
the Bishop could be held vicariously liable for the intentional tort.  Instead, the 
opinion only went so far as to establish that vicarious liability for the claim of 
fraudulent concealment was separate and distinct from vicarious liability for 
Melville’s alleged sexual abuse.76  However, because the Bishop did not make any 
argument concerning vicarious liability before the trial court, the issue was not 
preserved for appeal and the majority therefore did not render a decision on the 
issue.77   
On the issue of negligent supervision, the majority declined to make an 
exception to the charitable immunity protection.  Justice Silver explained that the 
policy rationale behind the doctrine was the protection of charitable funds and that 
                                                                                                     
 68. Brief of Appellant, supra note 58, at 25. 
 69. Picher, 2009 ME 67, ¶ 9, 974 A.2d at 290. 
 70. Brief of Appellee at 10, Picher v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, 2009 ME 67, 974 A.2d 
286 (No. KEN-08-81) [hereinafter “Brief of Appellee”]. See Jensen, 107 Me. at 410-11, 78 A. at 899 
(establishing the doctrine of charitable immunity in Maine); Coulombe, 2002 ME 25, ¶¶ 10-11, 790 
A.2d at 595-96 (upholding summary judgment for the Salvation Army on the defense of charitable 
immunity because it was a charitable organization).  
 71. Brief of Appellee, supra note 70, at 16-17. 
 72. Id. at 35-36. 
 73. Id. at 37. 
 74. Picher, 2009 ME 67, ¶ 1, 974 A.2d at 288. 
 75. Id. ¶ 10, 974 A.2d at 290. 
 76. Id. ¶ 31, 974 A.2d at 296. 
 77. Id. 
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“[a]lthough the rationale itself may be challenged as outdated . . . we would need 
persuasive grounds to hold that charitable funds should be protected against certain 
types of negligence claims but not others.”78  As a result, the majority’s opinion 
affirmed the Bishop’s status as a charitable institution and also determined that the 
Bishop had not waived immunity through the purchase of insurance.79   
Chief Justice Saufley, in a concurring opinion joined by Justice Levy, agreed 
that charitable immunity did not extend to intentional torts and focused on the 
legislative intent behind section 158 in reaching her conclusion.80  She asserted that 
the Legislature, with the enactment of section 158, did “not purport to define or 
expand the charitable immunity doctrine.”81  Furthermore, she reasoned that “[i]f 
the Legislature had, in fact, engaged in weighing the risks posed by intentional 
torts, including the potential sexual assault of children, against the possibility of 
destructive litigation costs . . . . one would have expected much more robust debate 
and much clearer language.”82 
In stark contrast to the majority and concurring opinions, Justice Alexander, in 
a dissent joined by Justice Clifford, found that section 158 did protect charities 
from intentional tort claims.83  The dissent argued that the phrase “negligence or 
any other tort” within the statute was not ambiguous and should be given its plain 
meaning:  “protection from suit for torts in addition to negligence, including 
intentional torts.”84  Moreover, Justice Alexander maintained that the doctrine of 
charitable immunity served an important function in allowing for the “continued 
existence of many community-based charitable organizations including local 
granges, arts organizations, fraternal groups, youth programs, churches, and some 
schools and health care providers.”85  He warned that, as a result of the court’s 
opinion, any one of those organizations would now be forced to expend their 
charitable funds to defend lawsuits through trial any time a plaintiff included an 
intentional tort claim in their cause of action, effectively ending charitable 
immunity in Maine.86   
IV.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Negligent Supervision in Maine 
Negligent supervision was first officially recognized as a cause of action in 
Maine four years before the Picher decision, in Fortin v. Roman Catholic Bishop of 
Portland.87  Prior to Fortin, the status of Maine’s negligent supervision law in both 
                                                                                                     
 78. Id. ¶ 9, 974 A.2d at 290.   
 79. Id. ¶¶ 33-39, 974 A.2d at 296-98.  The court reasoned that because the insurance policy (as 
interpreted by the court) did not cover acts related to sexual misconduct, the Bishop had no insurance 
coverage for claims being asserted by Picher.  Id. ¶¶ 36-39, 974 A.2d at 297-98. 
 80. Id. ¶ 58, 975 A.2d at 302 (Saufley, C.J., concurring). 
 81. Id. ¶ 60.  
 82. Id. 
 83. See id. ¶ 42, 974 A.2d at 299 (Alexander, J., dissenting). 
 84. Id. ¶ 55, 974 A.2d at 301. 
 85. Id. ¶ 46, 974 A.2d at 299-300. 
 86. Id. ¶ 41, 974 A.2d at 299. 
 87. 2005 ME 57, 871 A.2d 1208. 
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secular and religious contexts had been clouded in uncertainty,88 and the Law Court 
notably had declined to recognize the tort in ecclesiastical settings on several prior 
occasions.89  However, these decisions were made before revelations concerning 
widespread sexual abuse and institutional cover-up within the Catholic Church 
received national attention in 2002.90  Interestingly, the factual circumstances in 
Fortin were almost identical to those presented in Picher.91  In Fortin, the Law 
Court allowed a claim of negligent supervision to proceed against the Bishop92 and 
emphasized that “societal interests are at their zenith” when a situation involves the 
protection of a child from sexual abuse. 93  Moreover, the court explained that the 
context of the relationship in which the alleged abuse took place provided further 
justification for the imposition of a high civil duty.94  Justice Levy observed that 
“[a] child who is both a student and an altar boy is subject to the supervision, 
control, and authority of the Diocese on a daily basis”95 and that Fortin had alleged 
the existence of a “special relationship that ineluctably involved the actual 
placement of trust, as well as a substantial disparity in power and influence 
between him and the Diocese” that “[b]y its very nature . . . renders a child 
vulnerable to the possibility of abuse at the hands of a miscreant employee.”96  The 
court further explained that the Bishop’s duty to protect did not exist simply by 
virtue of Fortin’s status as a student and altar boy, but also required the assertion 
that the Bishop “knew or should have known of the risk of harm posed by the priest 
who abused Fortin.”97  The court observed that this duty was “closely connected to 
an independent statutory duty[:]  As the administrator of a school, the [Bishop] has 
been obligated since 1975 to report to civil authorities information that a child has 
                                                                                                     
 88. See id. ¶¶ 18-20, 871 A.2d at 1215-16 (discussing the uncertainty surrounding the status of 
negligent supervision in Maine prior to the Fortin decision); Sonia J. Buck, Note, Church Liability for 
Clergy Sexual Abuse:  Have Time and Events Overthrown Swanson v. Roman Catholic Bishop of 
Portland?, 57 ME. L. REV. 259 (2005) (arguing that the status of negligent supervision in Maine was 
uncertain and that it needed to be clarified in light of the church abuse scandal).  
 89. See Napieralski v. Unity Church of Greater Portland, 2002 ME 108, ¶ 1, 802 A.2d 391, 391-92 
(affirming dismissal of the case on factual grounds without deciding the negligent supervision question); 
Bryan R. v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of N.Y., Inc., 1999 ME 144, ¶ 22, 738 A.2d 839, 847 
(avoiding the negligent supervision issue by finding that the tortfeasor was neither an agent or employee 
of the church defendant); Swanson, 1997 ME 63, ¶ 13, 692 A.2d 441, 445 (acknowledging that it was 
unclear whether or not negligent supervision was a recognized cause of action in Maine, but assumed 
that even if it was, the claim would be barred by First Amendment issues under the factual 
circumstances). 
 90. See Martin Kasindorf et al., Boston Church Scandal Starts Chain Reaction, USA TODAY, Dec. 
19, 2002, at A13 (explaining that the media coverage of the Boston clergy abuse scandal in 2002 
sparked a nationwide reaction). 
 91. William Picher and Michael Fortin, as minors, both attended St. Mary’s Church and St. Mary’s 
school in Augusta, where they were allegedly sexually abused by their priest, Raymond Melville, who 
had been assigned to the church and the school.  Brief of Appellant, supra note 58, at 1; Brief of 
Appellant Michael Fortin at 1, Fortin v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, 2005 ME 57, 871 A.2d 
1208 (No. KEN-04-072) [hereinafter “Brief of Appellant Fortin”].   
 92. Fortin, 2005 ME 57, ¶ 76, 871 A.2d at 1232. 
 93. Id. ¶ 67, 871 A.2d at 1230. 
 94. Id. ¶ 34, 871 A.2d at 1220. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. ¶ 37, 871 A.2d at 1222. 
 97. Id. at ¶ 38. 
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been or is likely to be abused.”98 
Ultimately, the Law Court held that if a plaintiff alleged the existence of a 
special relationship,99 an action could be maintained against a defendant for 
negligent supervision in accordance with section 317 of the Second Restatement of 
Torts.100  The policy rationale at the heart of the Fortin decision was the protection 
of children from sexual abuse.  This was most clearly demonstrated in the court’s 
recognition that “[t]he profundity of the individual and social harm resulting from 
the sexual abuse of children and society’s interest in responding to the same 
requires little discussion.”101  Although the issue of charitable immunity was not 
raised in Fortin, this unconditional principal articulated by the court should have 
militated against the majority’s holding in Picher that charitable immunity barred 
all negligence based claims, even those relating to the sexual abuse of a minor. 
B.  Exception to Charitable Immunity for Negligent Supervision 
Given the compelling public interest advanced in Fortin of protecting children 
from sexual abuse at the hands of trusted members of the clergy, an exception to 
the charitable immunity doctrine should be recognized under Maine law for 
negligent supervision.  It is perplexing that the Picher Court dismissed Picher’s 
negligent supervision claim under factual circumstances almost identical to those 
presented in Fortin by stating that there were no “persuasive grounds to hold that 
charitable funds should be protected against certain types of negligence claims but 
not others.”102  The nature of a negligent supervision claim, as crafted by the Fortin 
opinion, distinguishes that tort from everyday accident-based negligence claims in 
                                                                                                     
 98. Fortin, 2005 ME 57, ¶ 63, 871 A.2d at 1229 (citing ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4011-
A(1)(A)(13) (2004 & Supp. 2009-2010)). 
 99. See Dragomir v. Spring Harbor Hosp., 2009 ME 51, ¶¶ 17-19, 971 A.2d 310, 315-16 (discussing 
the nature of a special relationship as it pertains to a claim of negligent supervision and explaining that 
“those fiduciary relationships in which there exists a great disparity of position and influence between 
the parties would qualify as a special relation” (citation and quotation marks omitted)). See also 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965) (explaining that there is generally no duty to control a 
third party from causing physical harm to another absent a special relationship that creates a duty to 
protect the other person).  
 100. Section 317 describes an employer’s duty to control his or her employee in a negligent 
supervision cause of action:   
A master is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control his servant while acting 
outside the scope of his employment as to prevent him from intentionally harming others 
or from so conducting himself as to create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them, if 
 (a) the servant  
 (i) is upon the premises in possession of the master or upon which the 
servant is privileged to enter only as his servant, or 
 (ii) is using a chattel of the master, and 
 (b) the master 
 (i) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control his 
servant, and  
 (ii) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for 
exercising such control. 
Napieralski v. Unity Church of Greater Portland, 2002 ME 108, ¶ 7, 802 A.2d 391, 393 (quoting 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 317 (1965)).  
 101. Fortin, 2005 ME 57, ¶ 67, 871 A.2d at 1230. 
 102. Picher, 2009 ME 67, ¶ 9, 974 A.2d at 290. 
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that it involves a betrayal of trust placed in a superior party by a vulnerable party103 
rather than a breach of a duty to act with reasonable care in order to avoid injuring 
a stranger.  This consideration becomes even more important in clergy sexual abuse 
cases because “the Church places priests in a position of ultimate trust and 
authority over parishioners.  In particular, children, with their absolute faith and 
trust, are strongly conditioned to obey priests.”104   
The Picher Court has, in effect, placed the policy of protecting charitable 
funds, and the benefits that the public recoups from them, above the right of a 
sexual abuse victim to seek compensation from an entity that breached its duty to 
protect that individual from the potential harm posed by a pedophilic priest.  This 
result cannot be reconciled with the majority’s pronouncement in Fortin that 
“societal interests are at their zenith” when a situation involves the protection of a 
child from sexual abuse. 105  Forcing a child who has been sexually abused to bear 
the full burden of that injury in the hopes that society as a whole will continue to 
receive the benefits from charitable institutions is fundamentally unjust and, as the 
court of appeals noted in Georgetown, is “out of step with the general trend of 
legislative and judicial policy in distributing losses incurred by individuals through 
the operation of an enterprise among all who benefit by it rather than in leaving 
them wholly to be borne by those who sustain them.”106   
Other jurisdictions have made similar exceptions to the charitable immunity 
doctrine through judicial opinion and by legislative enactment.  For example, the 
Supreme Court of Virginia in J. v. Victory Tabernacle Baptist Church107 allowed a 
plaintiff to recover against a church that negligently hired an employee who had 
been previously convicted of aggravated sexual assault108 by holding that “the 
independent tort of negligent hiring operates as an exception to the charitable 
immunity of religious institutions.”109  Likewise, the New Jersey Legislature 
amended its charitable immunity statute in 2006 to make it clear that charitable 
immunity does “not apply to a claim in any civil action that the negligent hiring, 
supervision or retention of an employee, agent or servant resulted in a sexual 
offense being committed” against a minor who was a beneficiary of the charitable 
organization.110 
C.  Why the Bishop’s Liability Should Not Be Limited to Intentional Torts  
Limiting a charitable entity’s liability to intentional torts poses numerous 
challenges to a sexual abuse victim’s ability to recover damages, especially in an 
ecclesiastical setting.  For example, as the majority noted in Picher, in order for the 
                                                                                                     
 103. See Fortin, 2005 ME 57, ¶ 37, 871 A.2d at 1222. 
 104. Kelly W.G. Clark, Kristian Spencer Roggendorf & Peter B. Janci, Of Compelling Interest:  The 
Intersection of Religious Freedom and Civil Liability in the Portland Priest Sex Abuse Cases, 85 OR. L. 
REV. 481, 511 (2006) (a detailed discussion and demonstration of the challenging issues that arise in the 
litigation of clergy sexual abuse cases). 
 105. Fortin, 2005 ME 57, ¶ 67, 871 A.2d at 1230. 
 106. President & Dirs. of Georgetown Coll. v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810, 827 (D.C. Cir. 1942). 
 107. 372 S.E.2d 391 (Va. 1988). 
 108. Id. at 394. 
 109. Id. 
 110. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-7.4 (West 2000 & Supp. 2009-2010). 
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plaintiff to succeed on an intentional tort claim of fraudulent concealment, he 
would need to establish, in part, that the Bishop failed to disclose a material fact 
with the subjective “intention of inducing another to act or to refrain from acting in 
reliance on the non-disclosure.”111  Establishing actual subjective intent on the part 
of the Bishop to mislead the victim is much more difficult than establishing the 
objective standard imposed by the tort of negligent supervision, which requires a 
showing that the Bishop “knew or should have known of the risk of harm posed by 
the priest who abused [the victim].”112  Thus, as a result of the Picher decision, if 
Child A is sexually abused by the agent of a for-profit corporation and Child B is 
sexually abused by the agent of a charitable organization, Child B will need to 
prove more than Child A to recover for the same injury.  This substantial increase 
in the burden of proof necessary to recover from a charitable organization is 
unwarranted given the policy arguments outlined above.  Moreover, a showing of 
subjective intent to mislead a sexual abuse victim may be even harder to prove in 
the context of clergy sexual abuse because the supervising bishop in many cases 
may not believe, personally, that a priest who has abused children in the past is 
likely to abuse children in the future.113  Further complicating such a situation is the 
possibility that a supervising bishop may hold a “sincere religious belief that God 
could and would change” the abusive priest.114 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Law Court, in Picher, refused to extend the scope of charitable immunity 
to cover intentional torts, but declined to abrogate the doctrine for claims of 
negligent supervision.  In doing so, the court was attempting to provide the sexual 
abuse victim in the case with a means by which to recover from the Bishop while at 
the same time remaining deferential to past precedent and the Legislature.  
However, as a result of the court’s reluctance to provide an exception to charitable 
immunity for the tort of negligent supervision, sexual abuse victims who seek to 
recover against the Bishop, or other charitable organizations, face a much higher 
burden than those seeking recovery against for-profit entities in that they will be 
limited to pleading and proving an intentional tort claim.  As the dissent noted in 
Picher, intentional tort claims, such as fraudulent concealment, are “easily pled, but 
difficult to prove.”115   
The Law Court has declared that “societal interests are at their zenith” when a 
situation involves protecting a child from sexual abuse. 116  The Picher Court 
ignored that declaration in declining to create an exception to the charitable 
                                                                                                     
 111. Picher, 2009 ME 67, ¶ 30, 974 A.2d at 295 (emphasis added).  The court explained that  
[t]he elements of fraudulent concealment are:  (1) a failure to disclose; (2) a material fact; 
(3) where a legal or equitable duty to disclose exists; (4) with the intention of inducing 
another to act or refrain from acting in reliance on the non-disclosure; and (5) which is in 
fact relied upon to the aggrieved party’s detriment.   
Id. (citations omitted).   
 112. Fortin, 2005 ME 57, ¶ 38, 871 A.2d at 1222 (emphasis added). 
 113. See Clark, Roggendorf & Janci, supra note 104, at 495. 
 114. Id.  
 115. Picher, 2009 ME 67, ¶ 56, 974 A.2d at 301 (Alexander, J., dissenting). 
 116. Fortin, 2005 ME 57, ¶ 67, 871 A.2d at 1230. 
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immunity doctrine for negligent supervision under the facts presented in that case.  
The Law Court should have made such an exception and reemphasized that the 
doctrine of charitable immunity is a creation of its own jurisprudence117 and that 
other than “one significant restriction imposed by statute, its applicability in Maine 
is controlled entirely by the precedents of [the Law] Court.”118  With regards to that 
restriction, it is also important to note that section 158 was enacted forty years 
before the court recognized negligent supervision as a cause of action and decades 
before revelations about the clergy sexual abuse scandal came to light.  Its 
application to present day cases must reflect these realities.  Perhaps above all else, 
the court should have been mindful that religious “institutions teaching divine 
justice, the dignity of man and his obligations to his fellowmen . . . would not claim 
on the basis of their teachings that they ought to be exempt from repairing the 
injury done by themselves or their agents to another.”119   
 
                                                                                                     
 117. Thompson, 483 A.2d at 707 (Me. 1984). 
 118. Id. (citations omitted). 
 119. Widell v. Holy Trinity Catholic Church, 121 N.W.2d 249, 254 (Wis. 1963) (a decision that 
abolished charitable immunity for religious institutions in Wisconsin).   
